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Debating Rape: To Whom does the Uncanny `Myth'
Metaphor Belong?
David Gurnham*
This article focuses on the language and metaphors used in debating
rape myths, arguing that it is their uncanny aesthetic and affective
qualities that accounts for the debate's fractious nature but also brings
the possibility of a more productive politics. For much feminist-
informed rape myth acceptance scholarship (FRMAS), `myths' in this
context are more than merely mistaken beliefs: rather, they comprise a
world made up of illusions or spectres that must be laid to rest. Critics
of this view, too, while critical of feminists' reliance on `myths' as a way
of stifling open discussion, likewise tend to use a discourse of myths
explicitly or implicitly and with a similarly disorienting effect. For both
sides of the debate then, `myth' serves as a disquieting, uncanny
metaphor that displaces and substitutes whatever else apparently
erroneous beliefs, attitudes, and knowledges about rape might signify.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent publication I argued that the adolescent female victims at the
centre of the English sexual exploitation trials of 2011 and 2012 significantly
came to be associated in the public imagination with the cheap consumables
that were used to win their trust. The most conspicuous example of this was
the metaphor `white meat' that identified the victims' bodies as objects for
the satisfaction of appetite and distinguished them racially from their
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predominantly Asian abusers.1 Focusing here on debates about `rape myths',
this article builds on the basic insight of that previous work ± namely, that
we can learn something important about our political and cultural discourses
on sexuality and violence by attending to such metaphoric substitutions ±
and takes it in a new direction.
It hardly needs to be said that the political stakes involved here are very
high. The topic of rape myth acceptance has garnered a degree of con-
vergence, but at the same time has also generated debate that is sometimes
fraught with discord. On the one hand, a broad consensus of legal scholar-
ship from various feminist positions insists that a `mountain of evidence'
supports the view that the public's understanding of rape is widely and
seriously distorted by the acceptance of myths: widely held stereotypical
beliefs that either have no basis in fact or else are ethically wrong inasmuch
as they serve to deny or trivialize male sexual violence against women.2 For
present purposes only, and without seeking in any way to deny the various
differences and nuances of positioning, methodology, and genealogy, I hope
I can be forgiven for referring to this consensus as Feminist-informed Rape
Myth Acceptance Scholarship (hereafter FRMAS). On the other hand, a
comparatively much smaller body of scholarship critical of FRMAS has
always existed, though generally occupying a more marginal space. This
latter body of work has questioned the methods FRMAS uses for ascer-
taining rape myth acceptance,3 the significance of its findings,4 and even the
very label of `rape myth' for the beliefs so determined.5
Without claiming to occupy a neutral or disinterested position, this article
argues that it may be both possible and desirable to take a step back from the
question of the truth of rape and rape myth acceptance, and to focus instead
on the hitherto unexplored aesthetic and affective dimensions of this debate.
It argues first that, being characterized as a dispute about beliefs, attitudes,
and claims that somehow exist in a world of unreal and insubstantial
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1 D. Gurnham, Crime, Desire and Law's Unconscious: Law, Literature and Culture
(2014) ch. 4.
2 This is the currently authoritative formulation as given in H. Gerger, H. Kley, G.
Bohner, and F. Siebler, `The Acceptance of Modern Myths About Sexual Aggression
Scale: Development and Validation in German and English' (2007) 33 Aggressive
Behaviour 422. The reference to a `mountain of evidence' comes from J. Conaghan
and Y. Russell, `Rape Myths, Law, and Feminist Research: `` Myths About Myths''?'
(2014) 22 Feminist Legal Studies 25, at 26.
3 K.A. Lonsway and L.F. Fitzgerald, `Rape Myths: In Review' (1994) 18 Psychology of
Women Q. 133; D. Gurnham, `A critique of carceral feminist arguments on rape
myths and sexual scripts' New Crim. Law Rev. doi:10.1525/nclr.2015.150001.
4 W.A. Kerstetter, `Gateway to Justice: Police and prosecutorial response to sexual
assaults against women' (1990) 81 J. of Criminal Law and Criminology 267; D.
Gurnham, `Victim-blame as a symptom of rape myth acceptance?: another look at
how young people in England understand sexual consent' (2016) 36 Legal Studies 1.
5 H. Reece, `Rape Myths: Is Elite Opinion Right and Popular Opinion Wrong?' (2013)
33 Oxford J. of Legal Studies 445.
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imaginings, debating rape in terms of myths amounts to using a metaphor
that substitutes whatever other meaning, usefulness or nuance that those
beliefs may otherwise have; secondly, that this use of metaphor has an
important uncanny effect. FRMAS's critics, too, while sceptical of this
understanding of myth, likewise tend to use the same sort of strategy, albeit
for them the myth metaphor is applied to feminists' own claims to tell the
truth about myths.
In approaching this debate by focusing on the aesthetic quality of the
language used in debating the `mythic' status of certain beliefs about rape, I
will try also to give an account of the uncanny itself, a concept which,
although not unknown within legal scholarship, has not to date been used to
frame rape myth discourse as such. In very brief terms, `the uncanny' is an
imperfect English translation of the German word unheimlich and tends to be
associated with the sense of unease, uncertainty, creepiness, and dis-
orientation produced by the sinister and supernatural inventions of gothic
literature and film.6 In these respects the word may to be understood as being
opposed to heimlich, which in German conveys a sense of the homely or
familiar. As a concept for intellectual study, the uncanny is most familiar in
disciplines such as literary, film, and cultural studies, and with intellectual
movements and positions such as psychoanalysis and deconstruction.7 This
article draws on Freud's association of the uncanny with repression, and uses
this to emphasize the tendency for opposing factions in the rape myths
debate to try to show that the other side subdues and obscures (that is,
represses) the truth about rape.8
I should make it clear at this point that I do not try to argue that Freud had
anything to say about rape myths as such (indeed, the term was unknown to
him), and nor am I concerned here with Freud's claim to be able to trace the
origin of the uncanny to childhood sexual repressions. Instead, my approach
in this regard is pragmatically political (in seeking to use theory to
reconfigure rape myth debate in a way that is productive and enabling) and
opportunistically disloyal (in presenting the uncanny as cut off from Freud's
larger psychoanalytical framework and alongside a theorization that Freud
rejected). It is an effect of the use of myth as a metaphor by both FRMAS
and its critics that means that the uncanny figure of the `double' or `doppel-
gaÈnger' can be found lurking there. This article thus proposes some ways in
which the uncanny might account for the particular difficulties associated
with creating space for a more productive political debate about rape and its
`myths'.
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6 S.S. Prawer, Cajigari's children: the film as tale of terror (1980) 112. On what
English law owes to and shares with gothic literature, see S. Chaplin, `Written in the
Black Letter: The Gothic and/in the Rule of Law' (2005) 17 Law and Literature 47.
7 See N. Royale, The Uncanny (2003) 23; A. Masschelein, The Unconcept: the
Freudian Uncanny in Late-Twentieth-Century Theory (2011) 13±14.
8 Freud's 1919 essay `The Uncanny', in S. Freud, The Uncanny (2003).
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RAPE MYTH ACCEPTANCE SCHOLARSHIP AND THE UNCANNY
In very general terms, FRMAS uses the metaphor of the rape myth to con-
struct rape-as-popularly-understood in terms of a ghost that must be
exorcised and laid to rest. In one way or another, FRMAS seeks to expose
the unreality and insubstantiality of popular beliefs about rape, and the
failure of those beliefs to withstand cold, hard scrutiny in light of the facts.
The designation of these beliefs as myths aims to show that, despite their
regrettable prevalence and durability, there is something ghost-like about
them, and as such they may be dispelled by being exposed to the `daylight'
of informed opinion. Following this metaphor further, FRMAS also
demonstrates why people are not generally willing to `give up their ghosts'
since, qua myths, they serve a useful social purpose. Ernst Jentsch
characterized the uncanny (unheimlich) by associating it with resistance to
ideas that challenge received wisdom. He describes the bewildering sense of
a `lack of orientation', the `mistrust, unease and even hostility' that tends to
greet new ideas that seem to undermine `the power of the habitual'.9 It is this
sense of security and familiarity in a corpus of received wisdom or
orthodoxy that Freud finds in the meaning of heimlich:10 a sense that may be
disrupted when we encounter its opposite (unheimlich). However, unlike
Jenstch, Freud describes unheimlich as a symptom of the return of buried
knowledge, or as he puts it himself, `that species of the frightening that goes
back to what was once well known and had long been familiar.'11 The
uncanny is thus a disruption of what we generally take to be real or natural,
as a result of the return of something which, for whatever reason, had long
ago been banished, suppressed or otherwise kept out of sight. The troubling
influence of the `repressed' that gives rise to a sense of the uncanny
represents what this article seeks to bring out in analysing the texts of
FRMAS and its critics, as we shall see.12
A strange quality of the German words heimlich and unheimlich as
highlighted by Freud and by subsequent commentators, is that in fact they
are not merely opposites: they oppose each other in the sense that the former
means `homely' and the latter `unhomely' as I have said already, but at the
same time both words can mean hidden.13 In other words, the `un' of
uncanny (or unheimlich) does not necessarily negate or cancel out its sup-
126
9 E. Jentsch, `On the psychology of the uncanny (1906)' (1997) 2 Angelaki: J. of the
Theoretical Humanities 7, at 8±9.
10 Freud, op. cit., n. 8, p. 126.
11 id., p. 124, emphasis added.
12 Royale, op. cit., n. 7, p. 1.
13 Freud, op. cit., n. 8, p. 132. In English too, canny and uncanny are rarely used in
opposition to one another, and indeed may be more likely to be used to convey a
complementary meaning, for example: `As a spy, Bond was a canny operator, and had
an uncanny ability to turn an apparent dead-end into an opportunity.'
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posed opposite, but merely `hides', `covers' or `denies' it. It is not difficult to
appreciate therefore why Freud came to insist that the prefix `un' is the
`token of repression',14 or the broader implication that `denying something at
the same time conjures it up'; that what is repressed is `always too near'.15
These observations arguably carry a normative implication for critical
scholarship and one that I propose to apply in the context of rape myths: that
we ought to sceptical about claims that a certain belief may be negated by
exposure to `the facts'; that we ought to remain open to the possibility that
such a claim merely represses that belief and doing so does not kill it but
merely keeps it at bay. On the one hand, therefore, for FRMAS the truth of
acquaintance and partner rape is repressed in favour of false beliefs and
stereotypes about `natural' male sexual aggression and `blitz' or `stranger'
rape its other. On the other side of the argument, FRMAS's designation of
certain beliefs as fundamentally wrong or unacceptable and hence beyond
any further debate, is itself claimed to be repressive.16
1. `Miscommunication' as a repressive myth
One argument commonly made within FRMAS is that to excuse rape and
sexual assault as innocent miscommunication and misunderstanding
constitutes a knowing denial of deliberate coercion that serves dominant
male interests. To this end, and in a manner not dissimilar to a psycho-
analyst's identification of unconscious knowledge and intentions in a
language-user's unintended slips, Kitzinger and Frith's exposeÂ of mis-
communication works on the basis that `even the finest levels of con-
versational detail, every speech error, pause, overlap or lexical correction
may be a `` designed'' or consequential feature of social action.'17 Their
analysis of non-sexual conversations in which people are heard to make ±
and to understand ± refusals without explicitly saying `no' (and instead using
techniques such as `pausing, hedging, producing a palliative . . .') leads
Kitzinger and Frith to surmise that:
young women are communicating in ways which are usually understood to
mean refusal in other contexts and it is not the adequacy of their
communication that should be questioned, but rather their male partners'
claims not to understand that these women are refusing sex.18
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15 Masschelein, op. cit., n. 7, p. 8; H. Cixous, `Fiction and its Phantoms: a reading of
Freud's Das Unheimliche (The `` uncanny'')' (1976) 7 New Literary History 525, at
537.
16 Reece, op. cit., n. 5.
17 C. Kitzinger and H. Frith, `Just say no? The use of conversation analysis in
developing a feminist perspective on sexual refusal' (1999) 10 Discourse & Society
293, at 299.
18 id., p. 310.
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In other words, the claim that responses like `um, I'm not sure . . .', `maybe
later', and `I'd love to but . . .' are inadequate as expressions of refusal is a
dishonest one that may be facilitating and covering up acts of sexual
coercion by men.
O'Byrne, Rapely, and Hansen followed this up with a study that analysed
responses given by men in two focus groups, finding that the men were fully
competent to comprehend the idea of refusing sex indirectly as well as non-
verbally.19 The researchers note how, when asked about how women might
signal refusal, the young male participants responded with examples
involving `a complete absence not only of . . . the word `` no'', but of verbal
refusals of any kind'.20 Then Jozkowski and Peterson's questioning of
college students uncovered a host of imaginative strategies amongst young
men for deploying miscommunication cynically to ensure they get the kind
of sex they want, irrespective of their partner's wishes.21 For example, a
theme that the researchers discovered `unexpected[ly]' was the use of
deception by some men (11.8 per cent) to gain consent to anal sex:
`Most women hate it, so I would slip it in the back door and pretend like I had
done it by mistake.' Similarly, other men wrote, `I would pretend like I did not
know I was putting it in her ass', `I would flip her over and pretend like I was
going to do it doggy style [rear-entry sex], but then I would stick it in her butt'
. . .22
What all these studies seem to agree on is that the figure of the innocently
misunderstanding man, although apparently real for many people, on closer
inspection turns out to be a fictive creation of male-dominated culture that
serves as `a self-interested justification for coercive behaviour'.23 This
creation ± this spectral double for `real' man ± tends not to be directly
invoked as such, but his haunting presence in the language of FRMAS is (I
suggest) an effect of constituting one thing (whatever it is that actually
happens when D claims that V's complaint can be explained as `mis-
communication') in the terms of another (a belief that is so fundamentally
wrong that it amounts to a myth).
At the same time however, FRMAS seeks to supress the metaphorical
character of construing miscommunication as a myth by expounding on the
cultural basis for the false beliefs in question. By showing that those beliefs
serve a broader ideology that prioritizes the interests of one group (men) over
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19 M. O'Byrne, M. Rapely, and S. Hansen, ` `` You couldn't say `No', could you?''
Young men's understandings of sexual refusal' (2006) 16 Feminism and Psychology
133, at 9±10, 13±15, and 16±17 respectively.
20 id., p. 147: `Mike: `` . . . [if] she doesn't respond in the same way then you know it's a
pretty good sign and you're not on the same level.'''
21 K.N. Jozkowski and Z.D. Peterson, `College Students and Sexual Consent: Unique
Insights' (2013) 50 J. of Sex Research 517.
22 id., p. 520.
23 Kitzinger and Frith, op. cit., n. 17, p. 295.
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another (women) they implicitly claim that the label of myth is a literal truth,
rather than a metaphor.24 Hence the three studies referred to above all agree
that, to the extent that miscommunication is popularly believed to be real,
this is explicable in terms of the strength of that ideology and the incentives
it offers both men and women to try sustain it. Imbuing `miscommunication'
with explanatory power, for example, arguably allows women to avoid the
`negative ramifications of being a rape victim',25 keeps at bay `the pos-
sibility that men are abusing their power in heterosexual relationships', and
offers women a sense of control over their future by `learn[ing] to com-
municate more effectively'.26 For men, meanwhile, it serves to `rationalize
and justify' coercive behaviour,27 and to `delete the accountability of men
for rape [and] to preserve a positive shared masculine identity.'28 For society
as a whole it fosters and sustains a sense of a just world (the belief that rape
does not happen to those who communicate `properly')29 and draws attention
away from structural inequalities and injustices that might otherwise threaten
social solidarity and cohesion.
Therefore, although I characterize these claims as an effort to supress the
metaphorical character of myth, they are made in order to establish that our
culture itself supresses the truth that men are routinely excused when they
subject women to sexual coercion, and to combat that suppression. For
FRMAS, heterosexual culture enlists a broad coalition of interests to sustain
its repressive ideology. For those individuals who buy into that ideology, it
should not be surprising if the encounter with the repressed truth (if truth it
be) might be experienced as unpleasant, disorienting, or as a `species of the
frightening [that] . . . should have remained hidden and has come into the
open.'30
2. What's sauce for the goose . . . turning the uncanny tables on FRMAS
But if the production of an uncanny effect can be described as any kind of
rhetorical strategy, it is one that is also available to and discernible in
scholarship that is critical of FRMAS. For example, replying to critics of her
129
24 See Lonsway and Fitzgerald, op. cit., n. 3, p. 134.
25 K.M. Ryan, `The Relationship between Rape Myths and Sexual Scripts: The Social
Construction of Rape' (2011) 65 Sex Roles 774, at 777.
26 H. Frith and C. Kitzinger, `Talk about sexual miscommunication' (1997) 20Women's
Studies International Forum, 517, at 524, 525.
27 Ryan, op. cit., n. 25, p. 775; see, also, M. Duran, M. Moya, J. L. MegõÂas, and G.T.
Viki, `Social Perceptions of Rape Victims in Dating and Married Relationships: The
Role of Perpetrator's Benevolent Sexism' (2010) 62 Sex Roles 505.
28 O'Byrne et al., op. cit., n. 19, p. 46.
29 T. Stahl, D. Eek, and A. Kazemi, `Rape Victim Blaming as System Justification: The
Role of Gender and Activation of Complementary Stereotypes' (2010) 23 Social
Justice Research 239, at 241±2.
30 Freud, op. cit., n. 8, p. 148.
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argument that feminists have systematically exaggerated the prevalence and
impact of rape myths,31 Helen Reece argues that it is FRMAS, not the myths
themselves, that silences honest and open discussion.32 Her calling into
question the designation of certain beliefs about rape as myths ± on the basis
that some myths are factually true, that others are not in fact widely believed,
and others still are not myths about rape at all ± does two important things.
First, it draws attention to the fact that the term `rape myth' is not necessarily
meaningful in any literal sense but is, in fact, a figure of speech designed to
group together a number of different matters under one banner, and to deflect
from potentially troubling factual distinctions. Secondly, it draws attention to
the repressive nature of the metaphor itself, both because of this substitution
of those different matters (factual truths, falsities not widely believed, and
sex myths) for one thing (rape myths) and the repressive use to which it is
put by FRMAS.33 An example of this repressive use is the campaign led by
Feminists@Law (a group of feminist legal scholars based at Kent Law
School) condemning both Reece's arguments and the LSE for providing her
with a platform from which to advance them.34 It made no difference that
LSE was Reece's own employer, that her paper had been peer reviewed and
deemed fit for publication by the eminently respectable Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies, or that she shared that platform with Professor Jennifer
Temkin (whose book Rape and the Legal Process is something of a
classic35) and Chief Crown Prosecutor for North West England, Nazir Afzal
to contest her position. In a telling passage, the editors of Feminists@Law
declared that they:
deplore LSE Law's decision to give a platform to Reece and Hewson's
dangerous and unsupported views and its failure to engage responsibly with
the public on such an important and sensitive issue as rape. Stating that there is
a distinction between blame and responsibility cynically elides the appeal to
rape myths embedded in the argument itself.36
The claim made in the passage above is that to call into question the truth
about rape myths as understood within FRMAS is a practice that is neces-
sarily and inseparably intertwined with rape myth acceptance itself, and thus
endorses beliefs that are fundamentally either false or unethical. Reece
reframes the distinction, crucial to the intellectual and moral integrity of
FRMAS, between right and the absolutely wrong as a mere difference of
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31 As presented in her 2013 article (Reece, op. cit., n. 5).
32 H. Reece, `Debating Rape Myths', LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers
21/2014 (2014), at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2497844>.
For relevant criticism of Reece, see Conaghan and Russell, op. cit., n. 2, p. 27.
33 On this last point see Reece, id., p. 20.
34 `A Response to the LSE Event `` Is Rape Different?''' (2013) 3 Feminists@Law. See,
also, Reece, id., p. 22.
35 J. Temkin, Rape and the Legal Process (2002).
36 Editors, op. cit., n. 34, p. 3, emphasis added.
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opinion. For Reece, the idea that having the `wrong' belief about rape
amounts to a myth is to create myths about myths. In appropriating talk of
myths in this way, Reece not only exposes the metaphoric quality of myth
discourse, she also makes a bid actually to steal it from FRMAS and claim it
for its critics!
We can readily appreciate the uncanny effect of this attempt to prise
the myth metaphor away from FRMAS and to use it to undermine feminist
scholarship. In this move, FRMAS find themselves in the sort of position
that Freud describes in The Uncanny: that of a staunchly rational person
who despises superstition being one day `caught' indulging in super-
stitious thinking.37 Similarly, the hostility within FRMAS to the myths
about myths claim cannot be surprising, given that FRMAS fundamentally
relies upon being able to separate truth from myth and facts from fictions.
We saw above that the studies seeking to establish that miscommunication
is a myth evokes the sense that the man who genuinely misunderstands the
cues is a largely fictional character. In the same way, Reece's argument
implies that FRMAS's image of the feminist researcher as a reliable guide
shining an authentic light of truth and ethical correctness on the dark
landscape of ignorant prejudice ± is similarly fictional. In both cases, the
character of the `double' is invoked as a result of talking about rape in
terms of myths.
To the extent that FRMAS finds its own status undermined in this way, it is
not far-fetched to imagine its proponents experiencing that same
discomforting and disorienting feeling of the `unhomely' (unheimlich) that
they are more used to producing in others. As if to confirm this, Conaghan and
Russell's rebuke to Reece takes the phrase `Myths about myths' as its title and
hence as the central problem for positioning FRMAS. If it is correct to say
that the myth metaphor as deployed in FRMAS is repressive, then this move
by Conaghan and Russell arguably evokes Cixous's characterization of the
repressed as `always too near'.38 In this light we may understand more clearly
the insistence by the Feminists@Law editorial that Reece's arguments
`appeal to existing rape myths in society'. Only by positioning her criticism as
itself a symptom of rape myth acceptance can FRMAS re-establish its claim
to control the myth metaphor it relies so heavily upon, thereby re-establishing
the reality of its own claim to truth, and its own footing.
THE DOUBLE IN THE JURY ROOM: RAPISTS AND NORMAL MEN
Let us now delve a little further into how the metaphor of the rape myth
evokes an uncanny effect by implying the presence of the fictional or
imagined character of the `double'. Such an effect is sometimes invoked
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37 Freud, op. cit., n. 8, pp. 154±5.
38 Conaghan and Russell, op. cit., n. 2; Cixous, op. cit., n. 15, p. 537.
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directly as an integral part of the myth metaphor, for example, in Kathryn
Ryan's description of rape myths in general as `a projection . . . of fears and
desires'39 or by Michelle Anderson in conceiving rape myths as visions
`conjure[d] up' in the mind.40 But if we are to find in FRMAS evidence of
the uncanny double whose defining feature is seeming to be identical to a
real person, we must dig slightly deeper into the metaphorical allusions in
FRMAS and their (sometimes intended, sometimes not intended)
implications.41 In literature and film, the encounter with one's own `double'
is uncanny in the sense I have described above because it is associated with
experiencing the hitherto familiar (that is, one's own identity) as
unfamiliar.42 In Dostoevsky's short story The Double, for example, the
protagonist Mr. Goliadkin is initially `confused, and even frightened', when
he first perceives that `this stranger [whom he passes in the street on a
miserable night in St Petersburg] now seemed somehow familiar to him.'43
When this stranger then turns up at Mr. Goliadkin's place of work as a new
clerk (the same job as Goliakin), the protagonist perceives with `horror' that
he is:
a different Mr. Goliadkin, completely different, but at the same time
completely identical to the first [such that it might be impossible to] determine
precisely which was the real Goliadkin and which was the counterfeit.44
What makes the story of Mr. Goliadkin uncanny for the reader is the
uncertainty it sustains about the status of his double: are we supposed to
think of the `other Mr Goliadkin' as real, as a ghost, or an illusion produced
by Goliadkin having a nervous breakdown? What makes this `counterfeit'
Goliakin ultimately so dangerous for the protagonist of Dostoevsky's story is
that, not unlike a metaphor, the double quickly begins to substitute and
marginalize the real. This process of doubling and substitution is key to
understanding how FRMAS uses the rape-myth metaphor and in so doing
achieves an uncanny effect. The remainder of this section analyses four
examples of this challenge. In each case, FRMAS moves to strip away a
normalizing disguise for rape and in doing so invokes the metaphor of the
double. We will focus here on intimacy, seduction, kink, and social drinking.
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39 Ryan, op. cit., n. 25, p. 274.
40 M. Anderson, `Diminishing the Legal Impact of Negative Social Attitudes toward
Acquaintance Rape Victims' (2010) 13 New Crim. Law Rev. 644, at 645.
41 Freud, op. cit., n. 8, p. 142; J. Fletcher, `Freud, Hoffman and the Death-Work' (2002)
7 Angelaki: J. of the Theoretical Humanities 125, at 126; Royale, op. cit., n. 7, p. 6.
42 See, for example, The Double Life of Veronique (Sideral Productions, 1991) and The
Double (Alcove Entertainment, 2013). The device is arguably also used, though in a
different way, in Fight Club (Fox 2000 Pictures, 1999) and in The Devil's Double
(Staccato Films, 2011).
43 F. Dostoevsky, The Double and the Gambler, trs. R. Pevear and L. Volokhonsky
(2005) 48.
44 id., p. 55, my emphasis.
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1. Intimacy
Louise Ellison and Vanessa Munro describe, across a number of publica-
tions, how participants in their empirical research (recreating the conditions
of a rape trial in order to study jury deliberations) betray reliance on mythical
thinking. They report, for example, that mock jurors try to explain away a
counter-stereotypical rape ± alleged to have been committed by the
complainant's former lover after having shared a glass of wine at her
invitation ± as a mutual and spontaneous rekindling of sexual passion.45 In
the case put before a panel of mock jurors, the `defendant' was designed so
as to challenge stereotypical assumptions by being apparently completely
identical to the stereotypically `normal' man in every respect except that he
seems to have raped a woman (that is, completely different from a normal
man).46 For the researchers, jurors' reluctance to convict in this case of
disputed consent indicates that acquaintance rape `remains peculiarly
problematic' in the popular imagination.47 Despite being `receptive, in
principle' to the idea of rape between former and current sexual partners,
jurors felt moved to reconstruct the event as one of consensual sex ± even
filling in the facts with speculation about the parties' internally conflicted
emotional and sexual desires.48 The degree of detail with which jurors
perform this extra-factual thinking would seem to imply that they are, in
effect, seeing double: by identifying so closely with a potential rapist, jurors
are moved to conjure a new and different character in order to save him from
conviction.
A very interesting double-doubling is happening here, because while the
implication of Ellison and Munro's research is that it is the jurors who are
projecting a fictional double to substitute the defendant on trial, this is itself
an implication that can only be drawn by first accepting that a plethora of
beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions about rape can be substituted for the
metaphor of the rape myth. The researchers' language testifies to a court-
room full of ghosts: to the `spectre of sexual miscommunication [that]
loomed large' in jurors' imaginations, creating a murky `grey area' in their
moral reasoning.49 Of another of Ellison and Munro's jury studies, Carline
and Easteal observe that a `culture of scepticism continues to haunt the jury
room.'50 The language carries obvious overtones of spectral, other-worldly
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presences in the minds of jurors and in the legal process. In this respect, we
can build on Sue Chaplin's appeal to the gothic in her critique of the
`marginal, mercurial quality' of law that acts `as a point of passage between
one order [namely the real world] and another [i.e. the supernatural].'51 I
would suggest that Chaplin's description could also apply to the function of
the myth metaphor, transferring or carrying over the meaning of a disputed
incident: from whatever might literally be going on to an uncanny figurative
language.
The language used in FRMAS to describe these spectral presences is very
appropriate, since the jurors' apparent motivations for projecting this
`double' strikingly reflect the motivations described by both Freud and Otto
Rank respectively: as `a means of protection' and as a `paranoid awareness
of oneself as an object of someone else's observation'.52 Participants in
studies such as those of Ellison and Munro would be quite right to perceive
themselves as the objects of someone else's observation, and if we assume
that their responses are accurately represented in the published articles, they
would furthermore have reason to feel it necessary to protect themselves
somehow against the implications of being provoked to identify with a rapist
(or victim). Like the initially sceptical Hamlet confronted with the `question-
able shape' of his father's ghost,53 Ellison and Munro's jurors are invited to
question the basis in reality for their beliefs. Indeed, the title that Ellison and
Munro give to their article ± `Better the devil you know' ± signifies much
more than a facile idiom. It also alludes to the devil's traditionally infamous
expertise in exploiting people's susceptibility to seduction and disguise,
misleading them with potentially disastrous consequences.
2. Seduction
A review of other studies provides further examples of how this imaginative
appeal to the double comes about when a potential rapist appears in the guise
of normality. These studies all achieve an unsettling effect by framing
apparently common and popular attitudes about aspects of `ordinary' sexual
life in terms of rape myth acceptance. A classic example is the ostensibly
sociable and pleasurable practise of sharing a bottle of wine during which a
woman and a man chat and flirt. For Ellison and Munro, these activities take
on the far darker quality of being `grooming' behaviours if they are engaged
in with the intention of having sex with the other.54 For Ryan, similarly,
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`[t]he socially skilled predator may be able to con himself and potential
victims because he does not resemble the myth of the obviously different
rapist.'55 In this passage of Ryan's, any doubt about the truth of the
defendant's nature is entirely erased, but access to this truth is so compell-
ingly and seductively disguised by rape myth that it even convinces the
rapist himself. At the same time, however, Ryan insists that such men are not
unaware that they are committing rape, but that they simply `believe it is
acceptable to coerce sex.'56 Certain empirical studies of sexual behaviour
and attitudes confirm the existence of this double-faced perpetrator, for
example, Jozkowski and Peterson's young college men who self-identify as
masculine seducers or lovers rather than rapists, but who (as noted above)
also openly advocate the use of various forms of deception or coercion.57 For
Ryan, not only is `sexual foreplay' a `precondition' for men to get away with
rape, but she further identifies the date rapist as he who will `frequently
profess love, promise to further the relationship, and threaten to terminate
the relationship.'58 The meaning of all of these words and actions, which we
might traditionally think of as part of ordinary sexual negotiations or scripts,
can thus be swallowed up by the myth metaphor.
3. Kink
This is a technique that is given something of a twist by Alex Dymock,
analysing the trial of R v. Lock (unreported) in England in 2013. Steven Lock
was acquitted on charges of assault occasioning actual bodily harm to his
female partner, whom he chained up and beat 14 times with a rope, in
accordance with a `master/slave' contract they had drawn up together.59 The
contract stated that her body was to become his sexual property (a fact
further emphasized by a tattoo around her genitals stating as much) and,
furthermore, that he would be entitled to punish her if she failed to fulfil her
obligations.60 Although according to the authorities of R v. Brown and R v.
Donovan61 consent is not available to violence that inflicts bodily harm for
sado-masochistic sexual motives, the judge did leave the defence to the jury,
and the jury duly acquitted him. Dymock describes Lock's defence ± that
they were acting out a Fifty Shades of Grey-type scenario ± as `ingenious'.
Notwithstanding the extremity of the behaviour and the complainant's
resolute insistence that she did not consent at the time, Lock apparently
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succeeded in positioning himself in jurors' minds within familiar normative
bounds, and hence what had happened as `harmless' consensual kinky sex
rather than abuse.62 Importantly it is not the improbable figure of the
billionaire dom, Christian Grey, who was summoned in the imaginations of
the jurors to acquit Mr Lock but, rather, that of the ordinary consumer of
popular fiction, whose sexual behaviours are likewise deemed to be within
tolerable bounds. For Dymock, however, Lock is a case of a woman's `sub-
jective experience of non-consent' being `silenced' by society's readiness to
find ways to normalize and hence overlook male sexual violence.63
4. Social drinking
In studies on attitudes towards alcohol consumption and its relevance for
rape, we find a similar sense in which criminal activity is overlooked and
excused as a consequence of the widespread normalizing of coercive
strategies. FRMAS will often seek to refute beliefs such as that many alleged
rapes can be explained as mere regrets about drunken sex, that alcohol
merely reduces a woman's sexual inhibitions, and that a woman who alleges
she was raped whilst too intoxicated to consent is likely to be lying. For
FRMAS, these are all myths that serve to excuse male sexual coercion and to
blame women.64 This designation of prevalent beliefs as myths is a move to
force people to confront the uncomfortable implication that practices (and
beliefs) commonly accepted as normal are not necessarily distinct from rape
(and rape-approval). As Shlomit Wallerstein warns, this does imply that `the
conduct of [normal] people in many cases [constitutes] a criminal offence,
and [thus that they are] rapists and sexual assaulterers.'65 Finch and Munro
similarly refer with strong disapproval to the `normalization' of the cultural
intermingling of drink and sex that explains the strong resistance they find in
their mock jurors to seeing alcohol-assisted sex as rape, despite those same
jurors acknowledging that this could constitute `taking advantage'.66 Once
again, we can see that the affective force of FRMAS lies in its defamiliariz-
ing of apparently `normal' behaviours, and thereby collapsing the distinction
between rapists (or potential rapists) and non-rapists.
The argument is emphasized by undercutting the popularly assumed
distinction between normal and culpable uses of intoxicating substances to
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gain consent. On this point, Finch and Munro are critical of their jurors'
apparent belief that (say) the buying of double measures in order to get a
woman drunk is normal, whilst the use of rohypnol would be compelling
evidence of malicious intent.67 The stereotypical thinking that jurors are
engaged in here, claim Finch and Munro, relies on the mythical distinction
between criminally devious rapists and the natural sexual opportunism of
social drinkers. Challenging this stereotype, Gunby, Carline, and Beynon
suggest that a man who uses socially normalized ways to `cause' a woman to
take alcohol (that is, by `encouragement, social pressure, and the intentional
buying of double measures') ought to be caught by s.75(2)(f) of the Sexual
Offences Act 2003, triggering a rebuttable presumption that the complainant
did not consent.68 Despite the statutory provision seeming broadly enough
worded to be applied in this way, barristers interviewed by Gunby et al.
seemed to think that this presumption could apply only in a drink-spiking
scenario. Even for legal experts for whom challenging the stereotype might
be professionally advantageous therefore, there seemed to be some unarticu-
lated and yet potent reason why the practice of merely buying alcoholic
drinks needed to be kept separate from deceitful drink spiking.69 Gunby et al.
furthermore find it `disappointing' that their interviewees seemed reluctant
to treat a complainant's lack of memory as evidence of a lack of consent and
thus for a prosecution to proceed.70 But are such apparent failures not
entirely predictable within the critical framework that Gunby et al. assume,
in which myths about alcohol and sex constitute a part of a `supposed
reality' in the popular mindset about rape and sexual assault?71 If nothing
else, then this research further demonstrates ways in which we might view
the affirmation of stereotypes as another example of a self-defensive reaction
against the troubling implications of being too closely associated with the
perpetrator of rape.
FRMAS AND THE CARCERAL STATE
This article has argued so far that the feminist-informed criticisms about the
insubstantiality of popular beliefs about rape (`myths') as well as counter-
criticisms about how FRMAS construes those beliefs (`myths about myths')
can be understood in terms of a struggle for control over the myth metaphor.
Freed from its fuller Freudian foundation in castration anxiety, the uncanny
offers a valuable tool for understanding the particular toxicity of debates
137
67 id., p. 604.
68 C. Gunby, A. Carline, and C. Beynon, `Alcohol-related Rape Cases: Barristers'
Perspectives on the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and its Impact on Practice' (2010) 74 J.
of Crim. Law 579, at 591.
69 id., pp. 594±5.
70 id., p. 591.
71 id.
ß 2016 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß 2016 Cardiff University Law School
such as this in which opposing sides accuse the other of using repressive
strategies in this way. But it is helpful also for guiding us towards a
potentially more politically enabling engagement with FRMAS's broader
theoretical underpinnings.
Janet Halley has argued that at the root of feminism from its second wave to
postmodernizing strands, is a sense that injury (and sexual injury in particular)
is only really intelligible or important when it can be articulated through the
formula of `m/f, m>f and carrying a brief for f'.72 The feminist `politics of
injury' carries the implication that, for example, an increased proportion of
accused men who are finally convicted and punished for committing rape and
sexual assault against women may be thought of as a political victory (so long
as the numbers of reported rapes also do not drop for any reason),
notwithstanding any possible costs that might also thereby fall `on myriad
social interests that can't be spelled in the alphabet of m/f.'73 Such costs might
be, for example, an erosion of defendants' rights to due process or the
potentially harmful effects of incarceration itself that most often falls upon
men who are already those most socially marginalized and disadvantaged.74
Halley's formula can seem provocatively reductive and she has been
criticized on this basis elsewhere.75 Whether or not we agree with
Conaghan's assessment of Halley's argument as merely `a series of glib
equations', it seems clear that what gives her critique bite is a quality that she
shares with all the other commentators (FRMAS or otherwise) considered
above, namely, her recourse to wresting control over a particular metaphor
that allows her to command her own terms of reference. Halley asserts that
feminism has a secret `Will to power'76 in allying itself with the aims of the
carceral state to inflict punishment: an alliance and a Will that (Halley
claims) is denied by feminists, who in maintaining a critical distance from
the state need instead to be seen as identifying with the powerlessness of
women subordinated by men (hence the `politics of injury'). Relevantly for
our own analysis of FRMAS and its critics, we might observe that a
frequently alleged consequence of rape myth acceptance is that too many
men go unpunished when they commit rape or sexual assault and that too
many victims are left without justice as a consequence of allegedly low rates
of reporting, investigating, prosecuting, and convicting rape.77
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Subjecting more men to carceral punishment arguably represents a shared
aim, at least in principle, but in practice, law's apparent failure to rid itself of
patriarchal bias blocks any formal alliance and legitimizes feminists' refusal
to acknowledge one. There is an uncanny evocation of the `doubling'
between truth and illusion here too, since the perspective that Halley
advocates is one in which feminist theorizing (and consequently, by
implication, FRMAS) involves the projection of the myth of a powerless,
subordinated, and injured group (or `class' if we follow MacKinnon's
Marxist terminology) that, in being popularly believed, masks the reality that
feminism in alliance with the carceral state is an empowered, influential, and
furthermore dangerous political force.
Halley certainly does not paint her picture (of feminism as secretly allied
with the state) in terms of repression, nor the exposure of this alliance in
terms of an uncanny return; however, her argument leads us nicely to what I
contend is the broader political significance of the uncanny. Halley writes of
her desire to cause `disorientation' in her readers: `Above all I hope this
disorientation ± however painful it might also be ± will be pleasurable,
erotically animating, and politically enabling.'78 But for whom could this
disorientation be `pleasurable' and `politically enabling'? Halley's account
of the benefits of `Taking a Break From Feminism' repeatedly returns to the
point that it is only certain people who are capable of (even temporarily)
putting aside feminism's presuppositions ± `m/f, m>f and carrying a brief for
f' ± who can `see around the corners' of these notions and treat them simply
as working hypotheses that may be laid aside when other, potentially
contradictory hypotheses may be more useful.79 Halley does not specify
what hypotheses may actually be `around the corners', but that is really the
point since for her: `Not knowing . . . is an erotic event ± risky, pleasurable,
obliterating, full of promise.'80 Those too dogmatic or unimaginative to
embrace such a laying aside will prefer to `wrap [themselves] tightly in
[their] secure and familiar social theory.'81 If this point of Halley's carries
any whiff of intellectual elitism, then, in this respect too, there is a point of
contact between her `erotic' politics and Freud's uncanny. As Brian
McCuskey has pointed out, in the romantic tradition of the nineteenth
century, the uncanny is not merely unpleasant for those equipped to appre-
ciate it properly, but is, rather, an affect in part to be desired by intellectuals
and artists seeking to distinguish themselves from soulless rationalists,
capitalists, and the working classes prosaically occupied by more mundane
concerns.82
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What this suggests to me, however, is that (for example) Reece's
disorientating critique of FRMAS and its theoretical commitments ± that the
editors of Feminists@Law and those who supported their campaign were
able only to understand as `deplorable' and `dangerous' ± also carries pro-
ductive and enabling potential. Inasmuch as this disorientation is identifiable
with the `uncanny' affect described here, it may not be very surprising to
find the sort of invocations of the gothic in Halley's writing as we earlier
noted in Ellison and Munro's mock jury research. For example, describing
feminists' privileging of harms that are expressible in terms of m/f and m>f,
Halley invokes the metaphor of superstition (`our precommitments ensure
that we'll `` see it because we believe it''')83 and of death (the `death-like pall
of sexual injury').84 Describing feminists' defensiveness about `prodigal'
theorists who abandon feminism in favour of other possibly more exciting
arenas, she refers to feminists experiencing a sense of being `pushed into the
grave'85 and to being `buried alive' by such betrayals.86 Reinforcing this
imagery of the grave, Halley imagines feminism as a kind of coffin that traps
its proponents with fixed and unbending conditions that fail to `create living
space' for the intellectual and emotional growth necessary for a living,
breathing movement.87 Feminism is furthermore conceived as an execu-
tioner who, wielding the power that it does and with the consequences that
this inevitably has, `must find itself occasionally looking down at its own
bloody hands.'88
We can follow the implications of Halley's use of such noticeably marked
metaphors to situate a carceral form of feminism, which is to say: a
feminism with hidden teeth and claws that are capable of inflicting real
injuries. Halley imagines this creature, first, as an:
old . . . dog . . . roaring that ominous roar and baring its teeth [and because he
was blind] I could not communicate to him by mutual gaze his success [at
controlling me] or the possible harm I could do to him.89
Secondly, she presents a re-reading of the Texas Supreme Court ruling of
Twyman v. Twyman,90 which found a husband (William) liable for the tort of
negligent emotional distress after he tried to insist that his wife (Sheila)
engage in bondage, despite it reminding her of being raped. Reading the
facts against the grain so as to reverse the order of (male) injurer and
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(female) injured, Halley exhorts her readers to imagine Sheila `pursuing
William like a Valkyrie for breaking [the moral law of the couple's sex life],
and her alliance with the state against him.'91 The Valkyrie is of course
invoked by analogy rather than metaphor, but the allusions to pursuit and to a
wartime alliance are powerfully metaphoric. Halley's reading provokes a
sense of disorientation by defamiliarizing the predictable order of m>f. The
point is to bring about the possibility for a creative `opening up' of political
discourse that we noted in Reece's complaint about the censorious implica-
tions of labelling certain beliefs as `myths'. Like Reece, Halley seeks to
trouble feminist readings in order to free questions of what a given account
about sexual injury means from the `monolithic'92 narrative of male entitle-
ment and female oppression presupposed by dominance feminism and
thereby to bring them within `our political reach'.93 We might think of the
idea of rape myths as part of such a monolith ripe for breaking up.
In order to regard either of these projects as potentially productive as
opposed merely to disarming and diminishing, we need to be prepared to
invest political capital in suspending commitments to presuppositions about
gender and harm and thereby risk losing that which makes the diverse
intellectual coalition that I have described collectively here as FRMAS as
distinctive and effective as it is. The question of whether or not Reece's and/
or Halley's re-appropriations of myth metaphors are indeed a positive
contribution is brought into focus by the critical storm that blew up briefly
around Gone Girl ± the popular thriller novel94 and Hollywood film95 ±
which begins with the disappearance of a woman (Amy Dunne). The
meaning of Amy's disappearance for the police and for the public watching
the case unfold in the media gradually emerges thanks to a trail of clues that
she leaves behind that ingeniously frame her unfaithful husband for murder
as well as for various acts of domestic abuse and rape. In this way she
exploits ± apparently from beyond the grave ± the susceptibility of the
police, public, and friends to being thus manipulated.
The key point of contention in Gone Girl that forced reviewers of both the
novel and the film to take sides, is that it seems to imply that the reason why
the police and public fall into error is that they do not operate on the
assumption that women who suffer domestic abuse (including murder) `ask
for it' or that women `cry rape'. Some reviews condemned the story for this
reason as `dangerous', `a gift to rape culture', the `wet dream of every
misogynistic men's `` rights'' activist', `the justification to misogyny', and as
affirming `rape myths' such as that `women are liars who will accuse you of
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rape if and when they want'.96 Others celebrated it for challenging female
stereotypes such as `women [as] innately good, innately nurturing', incap-
able of callous and terrible deceit about rape, and as inevitable `victims'.97
The reception of Gone Girl's audacious undermining of some key principles
underpinning FRMAS serves as a case study of the disorientating, uncanny
affect produced in rape myth debate. For some this affect may be experi-
enced as `pleasurable, erotically animating [or] politically enabling', but for
others, merely as a deplorable appeal to sexist stereotypes and prejudice.
CONCLUSION
This article has not sought to make any claims about the `truth' of rape itself
or about the culture in which beliefs about rape are formed. At the same time
it has not pretended to take a disinterested or objective perspective on the
relevant debates. It has instead offered some thoughts on the affective aspect
of engaging in debate about rape myths, whether from the position of
designating certain popular beliefs to be `myths' on account of their being
widely held despite being factually or ethically wrong, or else from that of
criticizing such a designation as just another form of myth making. The
article has looked to texts of FRMAS and also of scholarship that is critical
of FRMAS and its broader feminist commitments. It has suggested that we
can gain a clearer perspective on this point of contestation if we are prepared
to recognize, first of all, that the term `rape myth' is not (and indeed cannot
be) a literal explanation for the beliefs in question, but a metaphor. Secondly,
that there is profit in attending to the uncanny effect that myth-talk can have,
again from and for both sides of the argument. For, advancing a `myth'
argument with respect to rape and sexual assault seems to involve drawing
attention to the insubstantial, spectral qualities of beliefs that the `other side'
takes to be real and true. So the texts of FRMAS are populated with ghostly
apparitions such as men who innocently misunderstand refusal cues, and
who are merely the invented and imagined `doubles' for men who in truth
knowingly coerce and assault women. Conversely, the texts of FRMAS's
critics are populated with similarly insubstantial figures: feminist theorists
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who in truth can show us how to separate fact from myth (Reece) and who
are themselves disempowered, unheard, without any powerful friends, and
incapable of harming men (Halley). All of these are examples of deployment
of the same substituting metaphor, and consequently all are vulnerable to
being criticized for strategically narrowing the terms of the debate to a
certain extent. In highlighting this point, however, I have tried to emphasize
not only the political dimension of the uncanny as a concept that has
traditionally been marginalized in legal studies as being `merely' aesthetic,
but also some important continuities between conflicting perspectives on
sexual violence. The juxtapositions of `reality' and `myth' in this debate
invite us to consider the relationship between the seen and the unseen, and
the implications and consequences of dedicating one's efforts to bringing the
latter to light.
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